X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Instant Messaging (IM) systems using the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) [RFC9420] protocol can incorporate per-client identity certificate credentials. The subjectAltName of these certificates can be an IM URI or XMPP URI, for example.¶

Organizations may be unwilling to issue certificates for Instant Message client using a general KeyPurposeId such as id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth, because of the risk that such certificates could be abused in a cross-protocol attack.¶

An explanation of MLS credentials as they apply to Instant Messaging is described in [I-D.barnes-mimi-identity-arch]. These credentials are expected to be heavily used in the More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) Working Group.¶

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. The IM URI Extended Key Usage

This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-imUri, which MAY be included in certificates used to prove the identity of an Instant Messaging client. This Extended Key Usage is optionally critical.¶

id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {
  iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }

4. Security Considerations

The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means to identify if the certificate is generated to sign IM identity credentials.¶

5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These OIDs are defined in Section 4.¶

IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1 [ITU.X690.2021] module OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in Appendix A.¶

6. References

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [ITU.X680.2021] and [ITU.X690.2021].¶

<CODE BEGINS>

IM-EKU
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-mod-im-eku (TBD2) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

-- OID Arc

id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

-- Extended Key Usage Values

id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }

END


<CODE ENDS>

Appendix B. Change log

RFC Editor, please remove this section on publication.¶

• made Proposed Standard¶

• added a MAY statement in Section 3¶

• corrected typo in registration of the ASN.1 module (Thanks Sean!)¶

• updated author affiliation¶

• added ASN.1 module¶

• specified that eku is optionally critical¶

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Sean Turner and Russ Housley for reviews, suggestions, corrections, and encouragement.¶

Author's Address