Internet-Draft | QUIC for network property communication | October 2024 |
Joras & Ihlar | Expires 24 April 2025 | [Page] |
This document describes a new QUIC version. The proposed wire format and a set of procedures can be used to communicate throughput advice between an endpoint and an on-path network element. Throughput advice are sent in QUIC packets of a new QUIC version. These QUIC packets are sent adjecent to established QUIC version 1 and 2 connections, within the same UDP 4-tuple.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Secure Communication of Network Properties Working Group mailing list ([email protected]), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/sadcdn/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mjoras/sconepro-quic-protocol.¶
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This document describes SCONE, a protocol for the purpose of communicating throughput advice from network elements to endpoints. SCONE uses QUIC long header packets to send throughput advice in parallel to established end-to-end QUIC connections.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
A SCONE packet consists of a QUIC long header optionally followed by throughput advice fields:¶
SCONE Packet { Header Form (1) = 1, Fixed Bit (1) = 0, Throughput Advice Bit (1), Average Window Bit (1), Forward Bit (1) Reserved Bits (3), Version (32), Destination Connection ID Length (8), Destination Connection ID (8..160), Source Connection ID Length (8), Source Connection ID (8..160), [Throughput Advice (32)], [Average Window (32)] }¶
The most significant bit (0x80) of byte 0 (the first byte) is set to 1 to indicate a QUIC long header.¶
The next bit (0x40) of byte 0 is set to 1.¶
The next bit (0x20) indicates the precense of a throughput advice field in this packet.¶
The next bit (0x10) indicates the precense of average window field in this packet.¶
The next bit (0x8) is set by clients and indicates whether the SCONE packet should be forwarded or consumed by the first network element that sees it.¶
These bits are reserved for future use and SHOULD be set to 0.¶
This QUIC version uses the value 0x5509c337, which was chosen at random.¶
The byte following the version contains the length in bytes of the Destination Connection ID field that follows it. This length is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer.¶
The Destination Connection ID field follows the Destination Connection ID Length field, which indicates the length of this field. A Destination Connection ID MUST be at least 8 bytes long.¶
The byte following the Destination Connection ID contains the length in bytes of the Source Connection ID field that follows it. This length is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer.¶
The Source Connection ID field follows the Source Connection ID Length field, which indicates the length of this field. A Source Connection ID MUST be at least 8 bytes long.¶
The throughput advice is a 32bit unsigned integer representing maximum sustainable throughput through the network element. Expressed in Kb/s.¶
Indicates the duration over which the bitrate is enforced. Expressed in milliseconds.¶
SCONE uses packet protection as defined for Initial packets in section 5 of [QUIC-TLS].¶
SCONE packets do not have packet numbers, therefore nonces are created by combining the initial Destination Connection ID with the Source Connection ID of the packet. A sender MUST generate a Source Connection ID with a high probability of being unique for each packet.¶
A publicly known salt is used to derive the secrets, specifically scone_salt=0x6784619005cadc9bb961ec4d31b76892eb1b567e.¶
The labels used in [QUIC-TLS] to derive packet protection keys (Section 5.1), header protection keys (Section 5.4) change from "quic key" to "quicscone key", from "quic iv" to "quicscone iv", from "quic hp" to "quicscone hp", to meet the guidance for new versions in Section 9.6 of that document.¶
The goal of SCONE is to provide a way to communicate throughput advice between an on-path network device and a QUIC client endpoint, with the QUIC client responsible for the initiation of that communication.¶
Before establishing the communication, a QUIC client usually establishes a QUIC version 1 or 2 end-to-end connection as per RFC 9000. Once this is done, the client opportunistically sends a SCONE packet destined to the same endpoint IP address and port. This packet can be parsed by any capable network element on the path. All capable elements are able to respond to the initial packet in a similar fashion, by creating their own SCONE packets and sending them to the QUIC client matching the IP/port tuple being utilized by the end-to-end QUIC connection.¶
+--------+ +---------+ +--------+ | QUIC | | Network | | QUIC | | Client | | Element | | Server | +---+----+ +----+----+ +---+----+ | | | +----------- QUICv1/v2 ---------->| | | | |---- SCONE ---->|---- SCONE ---->| |<--- SCONE -----| | | | |¶
A network element that receives a SCONE packet from a client with the forward bit set to 1 MUST forward the packet. A network element that receives a SCONE packet with the forward bit set to 0 MAY drop it.¶
The QUIC client must be able to distinguish the end-to-end QUIC version 1 or 2 packets and SCONE packets. The QUIC server does not need to be SCONE-aware as it will ignore the packet based on the (unknown) version number.¶
SCONE packets contain both Source and Destination Connection IDs. A client who initiates SCONE communication sets both Source and Destination Connection IDs to randomly generated values. A network device that 'responds' to a SCONE packet sets the Destination Connection ID to the value of the Source Connection ID of the packet it responds to. The network device sets the Source Connection ID to a randomly generated value.¶
Communication using this new QUIC version MUST only be done with network elements that can be verified to be on the same network path as an end to end QUIC flow. This is because this communication is only meant to be done with network elements that have the ability to, for example, modify and drop packets relevant to an end-to-end QUIC flow. As QUIC packets for this new version are themselves carried in separate UDP datagrams from the end to end QUIC flow, there is not an inherent guarantee that they were generated by a network element.¶
A capable network device MUST set the Destination Connection ID Length and Destination Connection ID fields to the values received in the most recently observed new version QUIC packet sent by a client.¶
The use of keys derived from a publicly known salt does not allow for confidentiality or authenticity of the communication. The only manner of authenticity defined in this document is verification of the on-path nature of a network element. It may be desirable for this version of QUIC to be extended to allow for confidentiality and authenticity.¶
Confidentiality with this protocol could be achieved by further leveraging the provisions of QUIC version 1 to do a TLS handshake between the QUIC client and a capable network element. Authenticity could similarly leverage the provisions of TLS. However, this comes with significant complications. TLS achieves authenticity by using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), where each participant can choose to trust the certificate offered by their peer. While this PKI exists today for Internet endpoints, there is no such existing PKI for network elements. It is important to note that conducting a TLS handshake would restrict the communication between the QUIC client and exactly one on-path network element.¶
Alternatively, a network element could advertise a set of hosts to which the client can connect using QUIC version 1.¶
TODO Security¶
TBD - QUIC version.¶
TODO acknowledge.¶