Terminology and Use cases for Secured Routing Infrastructure

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document collects terminology in use for various secured routing efforts.¶

In addition, it may collect use cases that explain the terminology.¶

This documents is not intended to ever be published.¶

2. Terminology

Although this document is not an IETF Standards Track publication, it adopts the conventions for normative language to provide clarity of instructions to the implementer. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

BGP Security:

Mechanisms and operational strategies such as RPKI and BGPSEC implemented to enhance the trustworthiness and robustness of BGP operations, including route origin authentication, AS path integrity validation and other approaches against prefix hijacking and route leaks.¶

Routing Security:

Achieving correct reachability within and across networks by ensuring authentic and truthful distribution of routing information.¶

Secure routing:

Protect data security by ensuring data transits on trusted devices, trusted operating environments or trusted services.¶

Path Validation (BGP):

an examination of control plane messages to validate that the planned route is correct.¶

Proof of Transit:

Secure and verifiable logs or evidence of a packet's transit path in the data plane.¶

Path Validation (POT):

a verification of proof-of-transit against control plane information to validate if the packet was forwarded according to control plane path.¶

Planned Route:

unsure¶

BGP Security:

(such as RPKI) concerns itself with the authenticity of route announcements rather than the trustworthiness of the network operating environment.¶

3. Reference Network Diagrams

The following network diagram will be used to explain many aspects of the NASR problem statement.¶

In this diagram there are two ISPs, ISP-A and ISP-B.¶

Each ISP has a number of routers, uniquely numbered A-R1..A-R5, and B-R6..B-R9. In the descriptions that follow the labels for each router do not repeat the ISP number (A- and B-) when there is no confusion.¶

The routers are connected together with a number of links. ISPs A and B interconnected via A-R3<->B-R9, A-R2<->B-R8, and A-R5<->B-R8.¶

Routers R1,R2,R4,R5, and R6,R7,R8 are within a geographical region labelled "Country S"¶

There are two terminal customers labelled C1 and C2. They could be two locations of the same entity, or two entities that need assured communications between them. The customer C1 has dual transit connections to R1 and R4. The customer C2 has dual transit connections to R6 and R7.¶

There a number of possible paths between C1 and C2, for instance:¶

1. C1,R1,R3,R9,R6,C2.¶

2. C1,R1,R3,R9,R8,C2.¶

3. C1,R1,R4,R2,R8,R7,C2¶

4. C1,R1,R4,R5,R8,R7,C2¶

5. C1,R4,R2,R8,R7,C2¶

6. C1,R4,R2,R3,R9,R8,C2¶

7. C1,R4,R2,R3,R9,R6,C2¶

8. C1,R4,R5,R8,R7,C2¶

9. C1,R4,R2,R3,R9,R6,C2¶

10. C1,R4,R2,R3,R9,R8,C2¶

Of these paths 2,6,7,9 and 10 go through routers R3 and R9, which are not within the "Country S" geography.¶

The purpose of NASR is to provide control plane constraint on acceptable paths between C1 and C2, and then to provide a Proof of Transit that one of the acceptable paths was in fact used.¶

4. Use Cases

TBD¶

5. Security Considerations

Just words, no protocols in this document.¶

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests to IANA.¶

7. Acknowledgements

Hello.¶

8. Changelog

9. Normative References

[BCP14]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

Contributors

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